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Abstract
Background: Government- and charity-funded medical research and private sector research and development
(R&D) are widely held to be complements. The only attempts to measure this complementarity so far have used
data from the United States of America and are inevitably increasingly out of date. This study estimates the
magnitude of the effect of government and charity biomedical and health research expenditure in the United
Kingdom (UK), separately and in total, on subsequent private pharmaceutical sector R&D expenditure in the UK.
Methods: The results for this study are obtained by fitting an econometric vector error correction model (VECM) to
time series for biomedical and health R&D expenditure in the UK for ten disease areas (including ‘other’) for the
government, charity and private sectors. The VECM model describes the relationship between public (i.e.
government and charities combined) sector expenditure, private sector expenditure and global pharmaceutical
sales as a combination of a long-term equilibrium and short-term movements.
Results: There is a statistically significant complementary relationship between public biomedical and health
research expenditure and private pharmaceutical R&D expenditure. A 1 % increase in public sector expenditure is
associated in the best-fit model with a 0.81 % increase in private sector expenditure. Sensitivity analysis produces a
similar and statistically significant result with a slightly smaller positive elasticity of 0.68. Overall, every additional £1
of public research expenditure is associated with an additional £0.83–£1.07 of private sector R&D spend in the UK;
44 % of that additional private sector expenditure occurs within 1 year, with the remainder accumulating over
decades. This spillover effect implies a real annual rate of return (in terms of economic impact) to public biomedical
and health research in the UK of 15–18 %. When combined with previous estimates of the health gain that results
from public medical research in cancer and cardiovascular disease, the total rate of return would be around
24–28 %.
Conclusion: Overall, this suggests that government and charity funded research in the UK crowds in additional
private sector R&D in the UK. The implied historical returns from UK government and charity funded investment in
medical research in the UK compare favourably with the rates of return achieved on investments in the rest of the
UK economy and are greatly in excess of the 3.5 % real annual rate of return required by the UK government to
public investments generally.
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Estimating the rate of return (RoR) from public
investment in biomedical and health research
Realising benefits from medical research in terms of
preventing or treating illness, advancing scientific
knowledge and generating economic wealth often,
although not always, involves private industry [1, 2].
The private sector builds on and interacts with gov-
ernment- and charity-funded research and researchers;
it conducts its own further research, and develops
and commercialises medicines and other technologies
for use in healthcare. Theoretical and applied analyses
thus far published predominantly imply that govern-
ment- and charity-funded medical research and pri-
vate sector research and development (R&D) are
complements [3–7]. In other words, extra spending
on medical research stimulates, or ‘crowds in’, extra
private sector investment in R&D (and potentially
vice versa) and does not substitute for, or ‘crowd out’,
private R&D. However, thus far, the only attempts to
measure this complementarity have used data from
the United States of America (US) and are inevitably
increasingly out of date [5, 6].
The purpose of the study reported herein is to esti-
mate the magnitude of the effect of government and
charity biomedical and health research expenditure in
the United Kingdom (UK), separately and in total, on
subsequent private pharmaceutical sector R&D expend-
iture in the UK.
The importance of developing contemporary estimates
for how much government and charitable biomedical
and health research investments (referred to in aggregate
as ‘public’ research in the rest of this paper) stimulates
private sector activity, has been highlighted in two
previous UK studies looking at the economic returnsFig. 1 Conceptual model illustrating how public research interacts with prifrom cardiovascular [4] and cancer [8] research, respect-
ively. Both of these studies used a ‘bottom up’ method to
estimate the net monetary benefit of health gains arising
from historical public research investments. For the car-
diovascular disease (CVD) study the RoR from health
gains was estimated to be approximately 9 %1 and for
cancer approximately 10 %. In both cases, the RoR from
health gains can be added to an estimate of the broader
economic impact on gross domestic product (GDP) of
the order of 30 %, to give a total RoR of 39 % and
40 % per annum, respectively, figures that have been
widely cited in the policy dialogue justifying govern-
ment investment in research in the UK [9–12]. How-
ever, as acknowledged in both of those studies [4, 8],
although the GDP gain accounts for three-quarters of
the total return, it is a highly uncertain figure, based
on a small amount of empirical literature that is US-
centric and not necessarily focused on biomedical and
health research.A conceptual framework for estimating GDP gains
In the original study on CVD disease [4], two of the
authors of this paper (JS, JM-F) developed a conceptual
framework (Fig. 1) to estimate the economic gain result-
ing from government and charity investments in bio-
medical and health research. These investments can
have a direct effect on GDP (represented by the arrows
labelled B in Fig. 1) or can be mediated via the private
sector. In an economy such as the UK’s, the private sec-
tor is likely to be the channel via which the majority of
economic impact is mediated; the most recent data show
that government services contributed 23 % of UK GDP
in 2014 [13] and the charity sector was 0.9 % of UK
GDP in 2011/12 [14].vate research and development
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in measuring the arrow labelled A in Fig. 1, which re-
lates to the study objectives to estimate the magni-
tude of the effect of government and charity
biomedical and health research expenditure in the
UK, separately and in total, on subsequent private
pharmaceutical sector R&D expenditure in the UK. It
is possible that an exogenous increase in private R&D
could have an impact on public research spending;
and we hope to investigate that relationship (arrow D
in Fig. 1) in a future study. In the language of eco-
nomics we are assessing whether public and private
investments in medical research are complements to,
or substitutes for, one another. That is, we investigate
whether, in the UK, public research stimulates add-
itional private R&D spending or replaces it.
The effect of public research spending on private
industry R&D may then be multiplied by the social
RoR to the additional private sector investment to es-
timate the total economic impact. This is illustrated
as arrow C in Fig. 1. The social RoR includes both
the economic benefit to the private firms who are
making the R&D investments (the ‘private RoR’) and
the spillover effects on the rest of the economy. The
term ‘spillover’ is used by economists to describe an
investment by one organisation, public or private, that
benefits not only that organisation but also other or-
ganisations in the same sector of the economy (in
this case the life sciences sector) and in any other
sector of the economy [15]. In principle, spillovers
can also be to other countries, but our study is lim-
ited to the impact within one country, the UK. It is
important not to view spillovers as accidental, as they
are often a deliberate policy objective of spending on
public research.
Existing empirical estimates
There are two key studies, both using US data, that
estimate the magnitude of arrow A in Fig. 1. The
more recent is by Toole [5], who provides US esti-
mates for the long-term elasticity of private pharma-
ceutical industry R&D with respect to publicly
(National Institutes of Health, NIH)-funded basic and
clinical research separately. According to Toole [5],
who used NIH data from 1981 to 1996 and private
R&D data from 1981 to 1997, a 1 % increase in basic
research expenditure by NIH leads to a cumulative
1.69 % increase in pharmaceutical industry R&D
spend that builds up over 8 years. For a 1 % increase
in NIH-funded clinical research the increase in pri-
vate R&D is smaller (0.40 %) but occurs more
quickly, after 3 years. To translate these estimates to
the UK context, the HERG et al. study [4] assumed a
50:50 split in the UK between basic and clinicalresearch funded by the government and charities;
hence Toole’s findings imply, on that basis, that in
the UK a 1 % increase in public research would pro-
duce a (0.5 × 1.69 + 0.5 × 0.40 =) 1.05 % increase in
private sector R&D expenditure.
The other key study, by Ward and Dranove [6], did
not distinguish between basic and clinical research
but also focused on US NIH funding. This older
study, using US data from 1966 to 1988, implies a
considerably larger impact of US public medical re-
search on private pharmaceutical industry R&D than
was found by Toole [5]. Ward and Dranove [6] esti-
mated that a 1 % increase in NIH spend across all
therapeutic areas leads to a 2.50 % increase in the
total of private pharmaceutical R&D spend in the US
that builds up over 7 years.
This additional private R&D spend stimulated by
public research expenditure has both private benefits
(i.e. to the company making the investment) and
other social benefits (i.e. to wider society) as cap-
tured by arrow C in Fig. 1. In the HERG et al. study
[4], 11 empirical papers were identified that used
various methods to estimate the social RoR on pri-
vate R&D. From this evidence, the social RoR to pri-
vate sector R&D expenditure was estimated to be
around 50 % [4]. Combining that social RoR figure
to private R&D with, respectively, the Toole [5] and
Ward and Dranove [6] estimated elasticities of pri-
vate R&D to public medical research spend (and of
the time lags involved), implied a real annual eco-
nomic RoR to the original public investment of 26–
34 %, which was presented in HERG et al. as
“around 30 %” [4].
Since the HERG et al. study [4], two relevant re-
ports have been published. The first by Frontier Eco-
nomics [16], reviewed the literature on RoR to
investment on science and innovation. A lot of this
literature was covered by HERG et al. [4], with the
Frontier Economics study [16] effectively updating
this review. It concluded that the social returns to
publicly-funded R&D investments have found signifi-
cant, positive returns of around 30–40 %, but this
was largely based on the agricultural sector and inter-
national evidence. Frontier Economics cited a recent
study by Haskel et al. [17], which focused on the UK
and looked at how different industrial sectors interact
with publicly funded R&D. By modelling the impact
of public R&D on private sector productivity, this
study estimated positive and significant social returns
of around 20 % for UK public R&D investments, but
it does not have a specific focus on biomedical and
health research. Nevertheless, these two studies are
broadly in line with the previous estimate for the RoR
in terms of GDP of 30 %, and highlight the absence
Box 1: An overview of the modelling approach
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research. The econometric model is designed to capture salient
features of the relationship that exists between various time
series and is only as good as the data that are used and relies
on the abstraction of the underlying phenomenon under
study.
 Vector autoregression (VAR) is a commonly used approach
for describing the evolution of multiple time series data.
 A vector error correction model (VECM) is a restricted
form of VAR model that is appropriate when non-stationary
time series data are found to have one or more cointegration
relationship(s):
O A non-stationary time series is one where the mean and
variance are not constant over time;
O If a combination of two or more non-stationary time
series is stationary, then those series are said to have a
cointegration relationship.
 A VECM provides estimates for the short-run dynamics andPaper structure
The remainder of this paper describes how we esti-
mated whether and how far public research invest-
ments crowd in or crowd out private sector R&D
investments for the biomedical and health sciences
for the UK (i.e. arrow A in Fig. 1). The next section
sets out our methodological approach, including
introducing the econometric model that was devel-
oped, and details on how we collated and estimated
the time series data for the modelling. Our key find-
ings are presented in the results section, including
various tests on the strength of the model and a
sensitivity analysis. The final section reviews the
limitations to our analysis and its broader interpret-
ation in a policy context. We have provided eight
Additional Files that provide access to the under-
lying data, and various steps in deriving them, as
well as a literature review of drivers of public and
private R&D.the long-run relationships between variables (cointegration).Methods
Estimating the relationship between public and private
R&D expenditures in the UK
The results for this study are obtained by fitting an
econometric vector error correction model (VECM)
[18] to time series for biomedical and health R&D ex-
penditure in the UK for ten disease areas (including
‘other’) for the government, charity and private sec-
tors. It should be noted at the outset, and as dis-
cussed further in Box 1, that an econometric model
specifies the statistical relationship that exists between
various time series and is only as good as the data
that are used and the abstraction of the underlying
phenomenon under study. For an accessible introduc-
tion to empirical model building in economics see
Granger [19]. The VECM used describes the relation-
ship between public (i.e. government and charities
combined) sector expenditure, private sector expend-
iture and global pharmaceutical sales as a combin-
ation of a long-term equilibrium and short-term
movements. As noted below, we undertook a brief
policy and literature review partly to ensure that we
were aware of, and if appropriate, took into account
any major ‘shocks’ from the external policy environ-
ment that could impact on our model. As a result,
we included global pharmaceutical sales in this model
of long-term equilibrium because our literature review
identified ‘potential market size’ as a key driver of
private R&D, which we proxied by global pharmaceut-
ical sales (by therapy area).Targeted policy and literature reviews
In the early stages of the project, we undertook three
targeted reviews of the policy and academic literature.
The first was to update the literature review undertaken
for the HERG et al. study [4], and this identified two
additional papers as cited earlier [16, 17]. The second
was to see whether we could identify any significant
regulatory events that might have had an impact on
R&D (private, public, charitable) investment decisions.
We anticipated that, as part of the modelling exercise,
we might need to test for ‘dummy’ or categorical
variables where there was a major change in policy that
could affect the results of the econometric modelling.
The third was for drivers for public and private R&D
funding as these might need to be considered as control
variables in the econometric modelling. All reviews were
undertaken by using a range of search terms in various
search engines and bibliographic databases and ‘snow-
balling’ from that seed literature as necessary. We should
stress that this was not intended to be a systematic re-
view, but was designed to inform model developments.
Developing R&D investment time series
To measure the relationship between government, char-
itable and privately funded R&D we built a 31-year set
of time series comprising UK data for government, char-
itable and private sector R&D spend from 1982 to 2012
for nine different disease areas plus ‘other’ (the sum of
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multiple time series (i.e. by source of funding and dis-
ease area) to ensure enough statistical variation in the
modelling, but not so many as to create an unduly large
task of trying to identify public (and especially charity)
research expenditures for each of them. The selected
definitions were a consequence of the categories for
which charitable and government expenditure data could
be distinguished, while being sufficiently aggregated to
minimise the risk of significant changes in the defini-
tions of disease area specific data over time. As illus-
trated in Table 1, we focused our analysis on: Blood;
Cancer; Cardiovascular; Central Nervous System (CNS);
Gastroenterology; Infection; Respiratory; Skin; Vision;
and Other. These areas were selected as there was a
relatively strong ‘mapping’ between a historic classifica-
tion system used by the Medical Research Council
(MRC), the more contemporary Health Research Classi-
fication System (HRCS) definitions (used by funders in
the UK) [20], and Thomson Reuters Journal Subject
Classifications [21], used in bibliometric analysis as dis-
cussed below. Moreover, some of the areas were small
(e.g. Vision) and others large (e.g. Cancer) adding to the
variability in the data, which enhances the modelling. In
estimating these 10 time series we used a similar ap-
proach to that developed by HERG et al. [4] and Glover
et al. [8] for CVD and Cancer, respectively. Throughout
our analysis we used the UK GDP deflator at market
prices to convert all monetary values to constant 2012
prices [22].
Government expenditure on biomedical and health R&D
in the UK, 1982–2012
In the UK, the main government investors in biomedical
and health R&D are the MRC, the Department of Health
(DH) and the Funding Councils. Below we explain how
we estimated R&D expenditure for these three research
funders between 1982 and 2012.2
Medical Research Council (MRC)
Since 1970, the MRC used different systems for classify-
ing grants. For our analysis, we use the longest time
series for which a comparable classification is available,
which is between 1976/77 and 1992/93 and then subse-
quently from 2006 and 2012. For this period, annual
spend on funded grants was classified in two ways. The
first was based on the primary purpose of the research
and provided an ‘exclusive’ measure of spend by a num-
ber of headings. The second was a more ‘inclusive’
measure where spend could be placed against a number
of different categories. Using this classification system, a
‘Breakdown of MRC expenditure by subject heading’ is
annexed in the MRC’s annual reports between 1976/77
to 1992/93. In this study, we used the ‘exclusive’measure, as we wanted to avoid double counting be-
tween research areas3 and the subject headings as de-
tailed in Table 1. For the period after 2006, the MRC
uses the HRCS. For the intervening period between
1993/94 and 2006 the data are interpolated using an ex-
ponential function.Department of Health (DH)
The DH data include the National Health Service (NHS;
only collected in official statistics from 1995 onwards)
and DH expenditure on the policy research programme
for the UK (this includes National Institute of Health
Research expenditure from 2006/07). Using 1995/96 to
2011/12 NHS data published in the online version of the
Science, Engineering and Technology (SET) Statistics
[23], we extrapolated backwards the series for the years
1982–1994 and extrapolated the value for 2012/13 using
an exponential function. What is more, we generated a
DH time series by supplementing the DH data for 1986/
87 to 2011/12 published in the online version of the SET
Statistics with information for 1982/83 to 1985/86 from
a published report of the SET Statistics [24]. As for the
NHS data we extrapolated the 2012/13 values using an
exponential function. We then added the NHS and DH
data series together.Funding councils
The Higher Education Funding Council for England
(HEFCE) directly provided us with funding data for bio-
medical subjects from 1989/90 to 2012/13. The data for
1989/90 to 1992/93 were for the predecessor body, the
University Funding Council, and covered Great Britain.
From 1993/94 onwards the data are available for
England alone. Biomedical research was defined by the
cost centres/units of assessment used at the time. In
order to estimate a time series for 1982–2012, we used
HEFCE data for the period 1989–2012 (with adjustments
to include data for Wales, Scotland and Northern
Ireland where otherwise not taken into account) and
then extrapolated these figures backwards using an ex-
ponential function to generate data for the period in
question.
The DH and Funding Council data are not available by
disease area. We therefore used bibliometric data on
publications in the nine disease areas provided by the
Centre for Science and Technology Studies (CWTS)4 at
Leiden University (Additional file 1). In essence, we
multiplied the total spend of the DH and the total bio-
medical spend of the Funding Councils by the propor-
tion of peer review research papers with no private
industry author by disease area to proxy estimated DH
and Funding Council research spend by disease area.
Table 1 Definitions of field by different classifications
Field Medical Research Council HRCS a Thomson Reuters JSC b
Blood Blood: red cells (erythrocytes); white cells and
reticuloendothelial system (including bone-marrow); plate-
lets and coagulation (thrombosis); serum proteins (anti-
body, etc.); and inflammatory systems (allergy, histamine,
oxytocin, vasoactive agents)
Blood: Diseases caused by pathogens, acquired immune
deficiency syndrome, sexually transmitted infections, and
studies of infection and infectious agents
Haematology covers resources that deal with blood and
blood-forming tissues, as well as the functions, diseases,
and treatments of these systems. Topics included are
haemophilia, neoplastic disorders of the blood or lymph-
oid tissues, and mechanisms and disorders of thrombosis
Cancer Cancer: Carcinogenesis (chemical and physical substances,
ionising radiation, asbestos, mutagens, occupational
medicine); incidence/epidemiology; detection/diagnosis,
tumour biology, radiotherapy (radiobiology, adjuvants);
chemotherapy (drugs, therapeutics techniques – side
effects); and immunotherapy (immunotherapy)
Cancer: All types of cancers (includes leukaemia) Oncology covers resources on the mechanisms, causes,
and treatments of cancer including environmental and
genetic risk factors, and cellular and molecular
carcinogenesis. Aspects of clinical oncology covered
include surgical, radiological, chemical, and palliative care;
this category is also concerned with resources on cancers
of specific systems and organs
Cardiovascular Cardiovascular: heart (electrophysiology); veins (vasoactive
agents); arteries (cerebrovascular, arteriosclerosis,
vasoactive agents); lymphatics (white cells); hormonal and
metabolic systems (metabolism, electrolytes, hormones,
oxytocin, steroids, vasoactive agents)
Cardiovascular c: Coronary heart disease, diseases of the
vasculature and circulation system including the lymphatic
system, and normal development and function of the
cardiovascular system
Cardiac and Cardiovascular Systems covers resources
dealing with the diagnosis and treatment of heart disease;
coverage focuses on cardiac disease prevention,
pharmacology, surgery, transplantation, and research. This
category also includes cardiac testing, pacemakers, and
medical devices. Resources focusing on circulation,
hypertension, arterial disease, and stroke are placed in the
peripheral vascular disease category
Central Nervous
System
Central Nervous System: Mental health and mental
disorders; electro-physiology; epilepsy, head, Huntington’s
chorea, migraine, multiple sclerosis, rabies, and transmitters
Neurological d: Dementias, transmissible spongiform
encephalopathies, Parkinson’s disease, neurodegenerative
diseases, Alzheimer’s disease, epilepsy, multiple sclerosis
and studies of the normal brain and nervous system
Neurosciences covers resources on all areas of basic
research on the brain, neural physiology, and function in
health and disease. The areas of focus include
neurotransmitters, neuropeptides, neurochemistry, neural
development, and neural behaviour. Coverage also
includes resources in neuro-endocrine and neuro-immune
systems, somatosensory system, motor system and sensory
motor integration, autonomic system as well as diseases of
the nervous system
Gastroenterology Gastrointestinal: Mouth and pharynx (salivary gland, tonsils
and adenoids); oesophagus and stomach (foodstuffs
(hazards and constituents)); small intestine (coeliac
disease); colon and rectum (incontinence); hepatobiliary
system (metabolism – lipids, hepatitis), and exocrine
pancreas (cystic fibrosis)
Oral and Gastrointestinal: Inflammatory bowel disease,
Crohn’s disease, diseases of the mouth, teeth, oesophagus,
digestive system including liver and colon, and normal
oral and gastrointestinal development and function
Gastroenterology and Hepatology covers resources on the
anatomy, physiology, biochemistry, and pathology of the
digestive system. This category includes specific resources
on the prognosis and treatment of digestive diseases,
stomach ulcers, metabolic, genetic, infectious and
chemically induced diseases of the liver, colitis, diseases of
the pancreas and diseases of the rectum
Infection Infections: Viral and mycoplasmal (phage and virus,
common cold, cross-infection, hepatitis, herpes, influenza,
interferon, measles, poliomyelitis, rabies, rubella); bacterial
and rickettsial (bacterial cells, antibiotics, cross-infection,
drug resistance, venereal diseases, whooping cough);
mycobacterial, fungal leprosy, tropical and overseas, tuber-
culosis); yeast, protozoal (malaria, tropical and overseas,
vectors); Helminth diseases (molluscs, tropical and
overseas, vectors)
Infection: Diseases caused by pathogens, acquired
immune deficiency syndrome, sexually transmitted
infections, and studies of infection and infectious agents
Infectious Diseases covers resources on all aspects of the
pathogenesis of clinically significant viral or bacterial
diseases including HIV, AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases;
this category is also concerned with resources on host-
pathogen interactions, as well as the prevention, diagnosis,
treatment, and epidemiology of infectious disease
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Table 1 Definitions of field by different classifications (Continued)
Respiratory Respiratory: Upper respiratory tract (including epiglottis
and larynx) (common cold, influenza); airways and lungs
(allergy, asbestos, asthma, bronchitis, pneumoconiosis,
tuberculosis, whooping cough)
Respiratory: Asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, respiratory diseases, and normal development and
function of the respiratory system
Respiratory System covers resources on all aspects of
respiratory and lung diseases, including their relation to
cardiovascular and thoracic surgery and diseases
Skin Skin: Allergy, leprosy, psoriasis, and venereal diseases Skin: Dermatological conditions and normal skin
development and function
Dermatology covers resources on the anatomy,
physiology, and pathology of the skin. It contains
resources on investigative and experimental dermatology,
contact dermatitis, dermatologic surgery, dermatologic
pathology, and dermatologic oncology; tis category also
includes specific resources on burns, wounds and leprosy
Vision Vision: Electrophysiology, eye, retinitis pigmentosa Eye: Diseases of the eye and normal eye development and
function
Ophthalmology covers resources on the eye, its diseases,
and refractive errors; coverage includes research on the
cornea, retina, and eye diseases. This category also
includes resources on physiological optics and optometry
as well as reconstructive surgery
a Health Research Classification System (http://www.hrcsonline.net/hc/view)
b Thomson Reuters Journal Subject Classifications http://ip-science.thomsonreuters.com/mjl/scope/scope_scie/
c There is a Stroke classification: Ischaemic and haemorrhagic
d There is a Mental Health classification: Depression, schizophrenia, psychosis and personality disorders, addiction, suicide, anxiety, eating disorders, learning disabilities, autistic spectrum disorders and studies of
normal psychology, cognitive function and behaviour
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the UK, 1982–2012
We draw expenditure data on biomedical research for
the charitable sector from two sources: the Wellcome
Trust and the Association of Medical Research Charities
(AMRC) (excluding the Wellcome Trust). To be in line
with government expenditure data, we use ‘active in’ (in
contrast to ‘awarded in’ figures) for research grants pro-
vided by the charitable sector sources.
Wellcome Trust
Wellcome Trust expenditure on research is derived from
the Wellcome Trust grants database using a combin-
ation of keyword searches and classification terms devel-
oped and used by the Trust. Historically, grants have
been classified by Grant Officers using a thesaurus of
terms. A list of search terms was developed for the nine
disease areas of investigation applied to the titles of
awarded grants (Additional file 2). The time series for
‘Cancer’ was available since 1981 due to earlier work [8],
whereas the series for all the other disease areas start at
some point in the early 1990s. All the series, except for
Cancer, have been backward extrapolated between 1982
and the early 1990s using an exponential function.
Association of Medical Research Charities (AMRC)
The AMRC directly provided us with funding data for all
UK medical research charities except for the Wellcome
Trust, for which we already had direct data available. An
AMRC data scientist coded the charities according to
their main activity into one of the nine disease areas ac-
cording to the HRCS classification (see Additional file 3
for details). Note that data on funding streams is generally
available from 1992 onwards and we backward extrapo-
lated the values from 1982 to 1992 using an exponential
function. Note that no charities with main activity for the
disease area ‘Blood’ were detected in the AMRC database.
Private expenditure on biomedical and health R&D in the
UK, 1982–2012
The Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry
compiles and publishes data on total UK R&D expend-
iture by the pharmaceutical industry. Unfortunately, a dis-
aggregation by particular disease area is not directly
available. Similar to the approach to generate a time series
by disease area for the DH and Funding Councils data, we
use a proxy for research activity. We multiply the total UK
pharmaceutical industry R&D spend by year with the pro-
portion of publications with authors giving UK industry
addresses by disease area. To that end, we use an assumed
4-year lag between R&D expenditure and consequent
publication – we elaborate on the reason for that particu-
lar assumption in the econometric modelling section (seesection ‘Best model’ for more details and Additional file 1
for the bibliometric data).
Global pharmaceutical sales
As will be discussed in the results section, the literature
review (see Additional File 4 for more details) identified
global market size as a key driver of private pharmaceut-
ical R&D [25–28]. The published literature has modelled
in various ways the variable ‘market size’; for our pur-
poses, we use as a proxy ‘global pharmaceutical sales’ per
disease area. The source for such data is IMS Health, a
global information and technology services company in
the healthcare industry. In particular, we have used IMS
Health’s Annual World Reviews to extract global pharma-
ceutical sales, by disease area, from 1977 to 2012 [29].
We did this in stages, to match our nine disease areas
(Table 1, as above). IMS Health provides sales data at
Anatomical Therapeutic Classification (ATC) level, so
the first stage was to match the ATC codes with our dis-
ease areas. In the ATC classification system, the active
substances are divided into different groups according to
the organ or system on which they act and their thera-
peutic, pharmacological and chemical properties. Drugs
are classified in groups at five different levels. The drugs
are divided into 14 main groups (first level), with
pharmacological/therapeutic subgroups (second level).
The third and fourth levels are chemical/pharmaco-
logical/therapeutic subgroups and the fifth level is the
chemical substance. More information on ATC codes
can be found at: http://www.whocc.no/atc/structure_-
and_principles/. The nine therapy areas and codes are
provided in Table 2 (noting that we had to include a se-
lection of ATC2 codes for some ATC1 classes).
We had access to IMS Annual World Reviews since
1977. In each Review, the top 100 therapeutic areas by
sales (global), at ATC3 level, are included. For every year
between 1977 and 2012, we matched our ATC1 and
ATC2 codes in Table 2 with the ATC3 codes included in
the top 100 list, and summed across ATC3 codes where
appropriate, to obtain global sales per year for each of
the nine disease areas above. The Reviews also provide a
figure for the total global pharmaceutical market; we
thus obtained global sales for the ‘Other’ category by
subtracting the sum of sales across the nine therapy
areas from the global figure.
It should be noted that, over the years, the coverage
by IMS Health of the global market has increased. We
are not aware of all the nuances around increased cover-
age, but it would have expanded in terms of coverage
within any one country (for instance, including hospital
sales rather than sales at pharmacy level), and across
countries (including more countries over time). How-
ever, we expect that the increased coverage over time
would not bias our results, as we are primarily interested
Table 2 Matching our nine disease areas with Anatomical
Therapeutic Classification (ATC) codes
Therapy area ATC 1 and ATC2 level
Gastroenterology A
Blood B
Cardiovascular C
Skin D
Cancer L01; L02a
Central Nervous System N03; N04; N05; N06; N07b
Infection J, Pc
Respiratory R
Vision S01d
a L contains four ATC2 codes, but cancer drugs are only included in L01
(Antineoplastic agents) and L02 (Endocrine therapy). L03 and L04 refer to
Immunostimulants and Immunosuppresants, respectively
b N contains seven ATC2 codes, but we have only included the following five
ATC2 codes: N03 Antiepileptics; N04 Anti-Parkinson drugs; N05 Psycholeptics;
N06 Psychoanaleptics; N07 Other nervous system drugs. N01 refer to Anesthetics
and N02 to Analgesics
c J Anti-infectives for systemic use, P Antiparasitic products, insecticides and repellents
d Vision does not have a separate ATC1 code, and thus we used an ATC2 code
(S01, Ophthalmologicals)
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apy areas.
Key informant interviews
We undertook a small number of key informant inter-
views to validate and test our use of bibliometric indica-
tors of research activity to proxy the therapy area split of
pharmaceutical industry R&D expenditure in the UK, and
to ask for interviewees’ views on the drivers of their com-
pany’s R&D and its interrelationship with government-
and charity-funded medical research. We contacted senior
research managers from five pharmaceutical companies
with major research facilities in the UK and/or funding
substantial research activity (clinical trials, etc.) in the UK.
Four responded and were interviewed. The interview
protocol is available in Additional file 5.
VECM specification
All data analyses and econometric modelling were con-
ducted in EViews 8.0 [30].
Variables
To construct the VECM (for a quick introduction to the
technical issues see Enders [31] and Garratt et al. [32]),
we first run Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root
tests to check the non-stationarity of the five time series
[33], i.e. government biomedical and health research ex-
penditure, charity biomedical and health research ex-
penditure, public biomedical and health expenditure (the
sum of the government and charity expenditures), pri-
vate sector pharmaceutical R&D expenditure, and globalpharmaceutical sales. The ADF test is applied to the
levels and first differences, with and without taking loga-
rithms, of all variables. In the finally chosen VECM we
use variables in log form, which allows estimated coeffi-
cients to be interpreted as elasticities. In the best-fit
model, government expenditure and charity sector ex-
penditure are combined into a single measure of public
expenditure. We also adapt the best model into a speci-
fication that treats government expenditure and charity
sector expenditure separately as two variables.
Model
The VECM treats all variables as endogenous. Whether
the model is appropriate for our data is an empirical
question. The model details are chosen by a specification
search. First, the number (0, 1 or 2) of cointegration re-
lationships (long-term equilibrium relations) between
public sector research expenditure, private sector R&D
expenditure and global pharmaceutical sales is deter-
mined. Were this to be 0, other models would have to
be considered. Second, the number of time lags needed
to properly account for the short-term movements of
each of the three variables is determined. Third, the
presence or absence of a deterministic trend for both the
long-term and short-term effects must be decided.
Whether there are cointegration relationships between
the three variables is the key issue for the specification
of a VECM. Since the cointegration test outcomes are in
general affected by the number of lags included for the
short-term effect and specification of the deterministic
trend, the three model features must be determined
simultaneously.
Model search
Mindful of the moderate time span of our data (31 years),
the model was estimated with one, two or three lags in
the short-run dynamics [34–36]. For each case, four
specifications of the deterministic trend were tested [37].
The first assumes that there is no intercept or trend in
the cointegration equation (CE) and the vector autore-
gression (VAR). The second assumes that there is no
trend in the CE or the VAR, but there is an intercept in
the CE. The third assumes that there is an intercept in
the CE and both an intercept and a trend in the VAR.
The fourth specification assumes that there is a trend
and intercept in the CE, and an intercept but no trend
in the VAR. Results of cointegration tests from each of
the 12 specifications show whether there are 0, 1 or 2
cointegration relationships between the three variables.
The Pantula principle is then applied to select the
preferred model. The selection accounts for a number
of factors, i.e. the number of cointegration relation-
ships, autocorrelation of the VECM residuals, number
of insignificant coefficients in the VECM and statistics
Sussex et al. BMC Medicine  (2016) 14:32 Page 10 of 23that measure the relative quality of models (Akaike
Information Criterion, Schwarz Criterion and log like-
lihood ratios) [38].Best model
As already noted, for private sector expenditure and for
some public expenditure we have data at aggregate level
but not disease level. We use the proportion of publica-
tions in each disease area as a proxy to calculate the dis-
ease level expenditures from the private and public
sectors (Additional file 1). It is suggested in the literature
that 3 years is the median time elapsed from the start of
a new US public medical research grant and the date of
the first publication [39]. We tested models with time
lags from R&D expenditure to publication assumed to
be, respectively, from 0 to 5 years, and selected the lag
that gave the best fit. In this exercise, we combine
charity expenditure and government expenditure together
as one variable, which we call public expenditure. In a
subsequent step, the best-fit model is expanded to a speci-
fication that treats the two variables as separate, i.e. charity
expenditure and government expenditure separately.Sensitivity analysis
As reported below, we reviewed the policy literature and
considered the 1984 US Hatch-Waxman Act as the only
single event likely to be big enough to have had a per-
ceptible effect [40]. However, we did not include a policy
dummy 1984 in our econometric analysis owing to the
paucity of pre-1984 data. We noticed that a particularly
large increase in charity and government research ex-
penditure occurred in 1993 and so decided to test the ef-
fect of including two policy dummies for 1993 as
exogenous variables into our model as a sensitivity ana-
lysis. The first dummy takes a value of zero if an obser-
vation refers to a year before 1993, otherwise it is
recorded as one. The second dummy takes a value of
one if an observation refers to the year 1993, otherwise
it is recorded as zero. Thus, the first dummy would
identify any persistent effect and the second dummy any
pulse effect.Prediction by the impulse response function
The effect of a permanent shock to public research ex-
penditure on the level of private R&D expenditure is ex-
hibited by the Impulse Response Function [41, 42]. The
result shows how private expenditure responds to a
maintained shock to public expenditure in both the
short and long run. It also shows how private sector ex-
penditure moves back to equilibrium after a maintained
shock to public sector expenditure.Results
The relationship between public and private R&D
expenditures in the UK
Observations arising from the literature review and key
informant interviews
As already noted above, there were two key lessons from
the policy and literature review that were relevant to the
model development (a summary of the literature review
is in Additional file 4). First was the role of global
pharmaceutical sales as a driver for private sector R&D
investment – that is, the higher the level of sales the
greater the R&D budget. For this reason we included
global pharmaceutical sales as a control variable in the
model. Second was the need to allow for a possible
‘dummy’ variable for 1993 due to a large increase in
charity and government research expenditure.
The industry-based interviewees supported the use of
bibliometrics as the least bad proxy for the therapy area
split of their R&D expenditures, but highlighted the ap-
proximate nature of that relationship and the time lags
involved between R&D spending and consequent publi-
cation. They were not able to identify any alternative
data on R&D spending by therapy area, either from
within their own company or externally.
Government, charity and private biomedical and health
R&D expenditure in the UK, 1982-2012
Total UK R&D expenditures (public and private)
Figure 2 (accompanied by Additional file 6) reports the
total UK biomedical and health research expenditure by
the public (government and charity) and the private sec-
tor between 1982 and 2012 in constant 2012 prices. We
observe a gradual upward trend for the public research
expenditure figures. In 1982, UK public R&D expend-
iture was £1.453bn (in 2012 price terms) and rose to
£3.429bn in 2012, which corresponds to a 2.4-fold in-
crease. Disaggregating the public expenditure series into
government and charity, UK government sector expend-
iture rose from £1.093bn to £2.208bn, whereas UK char-
ity sector expenditure increased from £360m to
£1.222bn. Between 2002 and 2004, the rise in the public
expenditure series comes to a temporary halt, driven by
a slower increase in government spending and a decline
in the expenditure of the charity sector (from £839m in
2002 to £783m in 2004). Total public expenditure
bounces back afterwards and increases steadily after
2004.
Compared to the public research expenditure figures,
the data series for private pharmaceutical industry R&D
expenditure depicted in Fig. 2 (accompanied by
Additional file 6) shows a somewhat steeper upward
trend. In 1982, private R&D expenditure was £925m, ris-
ing to £4.207bn in 2012, which corresponds to a 4.5-fold
increase over the observation period. Furthermore, the
Fig. 2 Total UK research and development expenditure (government, charity and private), 1982–2012 (£m, 2012 constant prices)
Sussex et al. BMC Medicine  (2016) 14:32 Page 11 of 23figures suggest that private R&D expenditure is subject
to more variation than public research expenditure.
UK R&D expenditures by disease areas (public and private)
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the public (government and
charity) and private R&D expenditure figures by disease
area between 1982 and 2008 in the logarithmic form in
which they feed into the econometric models. Note that2.8
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Fig. 3 Public (government and charity) research and development (log) exthe underlying data is available in Additional file 6 (in-
cluding public expenditure figures broken down by gov-
ernment and charity).
Similar to the aggregated data series reported in the
previous section, at the disease area level we observe, in
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than for the public sector.
Looking at specific disease areas in more depth, we
further observe, for instance, that for ‘Blood’ public
R&D expenditure is for almost all years over the obser-
vation period smaller than private expenditure (except in
year 1983, where there is a fall in private expenditure,
followed by a strong upward trend). In ‘CNS’ private ex-
penditure there is an upward trend since 1982 (with
short interruptions in 1984 and 1993), which flattens
and somewhat reverses with the start of year 1997. In
contrast, the trend for public ‘CNS’ expenditure is some-
what flat between 1982 and 1990 and subsequently rises
steeply until around 2006. For all years, private R&D ex-
penditure exceeds public R&D in the disease area ‘CNS’.
The disease area ‘Cancer’ represents one of the largest
areas of biomedical research funding, both for the public
and the private sector, and for the majority of years over
the observation period, public expenditure related to
cancer research exceed private expenditure. The public
cancer research series further follows a relatively steady
upward trend since 1982, with two smaller interruptions
in 1990 and 2004. The private expenditure series for
‘Cancer’ shows more variation over time with two larger
interruptions in 1990 and 1995. In ‘Cardiovascular’, the
private expenditure series follows no clear trend up until
1996, followed by a small upward trend thereafter but
with rather strong variation between 1982 and 2008,
with the lowest level of private funding in the area rea-
lised in 1992. In contrast, the ‘Cardiovascular’ publicR&D expenditure series follows a slightly increasing
trend between 1982, interrupted in 1996 and followed
by a steady rise until 2008. For the majority of the years
in our observation period, private expenditure exceeds
public expenditure in cardiovascular research. ‘Gastro-
enterology’ is an interesting area insofar as public ex-
penditure in the field follows a downward trend until
about 1992, increases somewhat thereafter and increas-
ing strongly since 1999. Furthermore, the private ex-
penditure series for ‘Gastroenterology’ shows an upward
trend overall with some variation over time (for instance,
1986 and between 1993 and 1996). Similar to the ‘CNS’
expenditure series, private expenditure on gastroenter-
ology research exceeds public expenditure for all years.
For the disease area ‘Infectious Diseases’, the public and
private R&D expenditure series differ with regard to the
trend pattern. Whereas the public expenditure series
shows a steady increasing trend since 1982 (with small
interruptions in 1984, 1990 and 2005), the private ex-
penditure series shows a lot more variation and a fairly
flat trend after 1994. However, for the majority of the
years, private R&D still exceeds public research expend-
iture in the ‘Infectious Diseases’ area. The two smallest
disease areas we look at in more depth are ‘Skin’ and ‘Vi-
sion’, which both follow similar trends over time. Public
expenditure in the two areas is relatively flat until about
1993 and subsequently takes off. In both areas, public
expenditure levels are very similar over the observation
period. This is different in the private expenditure series,
where private spending in ‘Skin’ generally exceeds
Sussex et al. BMC Medicine  (2016) 14:32 Page 13 of 23funding in ‘Vision’, but both private series follow a some-
what upward trend with interruptions. Although private
expenditure exceeds public expenditure for all years in
‘Skin’, in ‘Vision’, for the majority of years, public spend
exceeds private spend. In the disease area ‘Respiratory’
we observe a relative flat trend in public research, with
variation, until around 1997, when a general upward
trend in public expenditure in the area kicks in. For the
private expenditure series in the respiratory area we ob-
serve a relatively strong downturn from 1982 to 1985,
followed by an upward trend thereafter. What is more,
for the majority of the years, in ‘Respiratory’ private ex-
penditure exceeds public expenditure (except 1984 and
1985).
Global pharmaceutical sales
Figure 5 illustrates global pharmaceutical sales (in £m, in
2012 price terms) in logarithmic form by disease area
from 1982. Overall, the expenditure patterns in the fig-
ure reveal an upward trend in global medicine sales in
all the disease areas. However, looking at specific disease
areas we observe some variation. For instance in ‘Blood’,
there is a decrease in sales from 1988 to 1989, followed
by a steady upward trend thereafter. The ‘Cancer’
medicines global sales series somewhat interrupts in
1993, with a decrease in sales between 1993 and 1994,
but is followed by a steady increase thereafter. Interest-
ingly, the global pharmaceutical sales series shows a par-
ticularly strong rise in sales starting in 1999 in most
disease areas.8.0
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Fig. 5 Global pharmaceutical (log) sales by disease area 1982–2008 (£m, 20Econometric modelling
Overall, our results suggest that there is a statistically
significant complementary relationship between public
biomedical and health research expenditure and private
pharmaceutical R&D expenditure. A 1 % increase in
public sector expenditure is associated in the best-fit
model with a 0.81 % increase in private sector expend-
iture. The sensitivity analysis, with dummy variables for
1993 and subsequently, produces a similar and statisti-
cally significant result but with a slightly smaller positive
elasticity of 0.68.
Variables
The ADF unit root test results are reported in Table A
in Additional file 7. The null hypothesis for the ADF
unit root test is that the individual series is a unit root
process. The results suggest that the five variables are
non-stationary in levels or logs, but stationary in first
differences of levels or logs; we treat the contrary result
for log(private) as an artefact of the pooling of individual
series outcomes and discount it.
Determining the best-fit model
Results from the 12 tested models are reported in Tables
B–D in Additional file 7. Each table reports performance
of four specifications, one for each deterministic trend
specification. In this preliminary search the time-lag be-
tween funding and publication is treated as zero.
For each specification of the model we report six sta-
tistics: the cointegration rank, the statistics from the7
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Schwarz criterion, log likelihood statistics, and the num-
ber of insignificant coefficients in the VECM. We com-
pare the performance of models using those statistics.
The cointegration rank is the estimated number of coin-
tegration relationships (long-term equilibria) between
the three variables. ‘Not available’ in Tables B–D in
Additional file 7 suggests that there is no cointegration
relationship for a specification. Statistics from residual
portmanteau autocorrelation tests report the number of
lags, with a maximum of six, with absence of a serial
correlation problem. The maximum lag 6 tested was
chosen pragmatically as the sample is quite short (31 ob-
servations for each disease area) and from previous lit-
erature [5, 6]. If the number reported is less than 6, a
specification problem (serial correlation) is suggested.
For the Akaike Information Criterion and Schwarz cri-
terion, the chosen model should be the one that mini-
mises the adopted criterion. Log likelihood statistics
parallel the use of information criterion. A larger log
likelihood statistic suggests a better model fit. The num-
ber of insignificant coefficients shows the number of re-
dundant coefficients in the error correction models in
relation to the total number of coefficients in the VECM.
We define insignificant coefficients as those with abso-
lute t-values less than 2. The larger the number of insig-
nificant coefficients, the less desirable is the model.
The Pantula principle of parsimony was used to select
the best performing model. It picks the most parsimoni-
ous model that is not rejected by the cointegration rank
tests. The VECM with deterministic trend type 3 and
one lag interval performs the best, as shown in the
fourth column of Table B in Additional file 7.
Having identified a preferred model, we report re-
sults from five variants that allow for different time
lags between the date of investment from private sec-
tor (and government) and the date of first publica-
tion, in Table E of Additional file 7. The basic model
is labelled as the t + 0 model. Again, we applied the
Pantula principle to select the best model. Only the
t + 0 and t + 4 models pass the residual autocorrel-
ation tests for up to six lags. The literature suggests
a median of 3 year lag between R&D investment and
first publication [39]. Our t + 4 model performed bet-
ter than t + 3 and t + 5, so we chose the t + 4 model
as our best model.
Results from the best-fit model
The results presented in Table 3 and Eq. 1 suggest that,
in the long run, there is a statistically significant comple-
mentary (‘crowding in’) relationship between public
biomedical and health expenditure and private pharma-
ceutical R&D expenditure. The elasticity of private sec-
tor expenditure with respect to the public expenditurefrom each model is reported by the second column of
Table 3. This takes the value 0.81 in the best-fit (t + 4)
model shown in Table 3, and ranges from 0.38 to 1.12 in
the other models.
Δyit ¼ ΓΔyit−1 þ α βyit−1 þ μð Þ þ γ þ εit
where yit ¼ privateit ; publicit ; saleit½ ’ ð1Þ
Where yit is a 3 × 1 vector, i refers to disease area, t re-
fers to year, Γ is a matrix of autoregression coefficients,
α is the vector of equilibrium-correction coefficients that
adjust for short-run departures from the long-run (coin-
tegration) equation, μ is the vector of intercepts in the
cointegration equation, and γ is a vector of drift terms.
The results suggest that there is one cointegration re-
lationship between the three variables. In the long run,
public sector expenditure and private sector expenditure
are complements and a 1 % increase in public sector ex-
penditure is associated with an increase of 0.81 % in pri-
vate sector expenditure. The long-run relationship
between private sector expenditure and global pharma-
ceutical sales is not statistically significant.
The three coefficients on cointegration Eq. 1 suggest
how each of the three variables responds to a deviation
from long-run equilibrium. A positive deviation from
equilibrium, which could be the result of a relative ex-
cess of private sector investment in R&D, leads to an in-
crease of public sector expenditure and a decrease of
private sector itself from the relative excess of private in-
vestment. However, global pharmaceutical sales do not
respond to any deviation from equilibrium.
Table 4 reports results from adapting the best model
to estimate the elasticity of private R&D expenditure
with respect to government research expenditure and
with respect to charity sector research expenditure sep-
arately. The results suggest that, in the long run, a 1 %
increase in government sector expenditure is associated
with a 0.66 % increase in private sector expenditure.
Similarly, a 1 % increase in charity sector expenditure
(which has been somewhat smaller than government ex-
penditure) is associated with a 0.21 % increase in private
sector expenditure. If the two components of public ex-
penditure were in fixed proportions over time, the two
estimated elasticities would sum to 0.81, which is ap-
proximately the case here. Global pharmaceutical sales
have no significant relationship with the private sector
expenditure in the long run.
To test the sensitivity of our results to a possible shift
in the relationship in 1993, we included two policy dum-
mies as exogenous variables. The results are reported in
Additional file 8. The key elasticity estimate is decreased
slightly, from 0.81 to 0.68, as a result. The policy dummy
that controls the trend effect of year 1993 is significant
Table 3 The best model
Cointegration equation Cointegration equation 1
Lnprivate (−1) 1
Lnpublic (−1) −0.81
(0.14)
[−5.81]
Lnsale (−1) 0.12
(0.20)
[0.63]
Intercept −2.55
Error correction D(lnprivate) D(lnpublic) D(lnsale)
Cointegration equation 1 −0.10 0.02 −0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
[−3.58] [2.70] [−0.49]
D(lnprivate(−1)) −0.20 −0.02 0.01
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
[−3.45] [−1.72] [0.87]
D(lnpublic(−1)) 0.29 0.04 −0.01
(0.27) (0.06) (0.06)
[1.08] [0.67] [−0.16]
D(lnsale(−1)) 0.28 0.07 0.15
(0.26) (0.06) (0.06)
[1.10] [1.09] [2.52]
Intercept 0.05 0.04 0.06
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
[1.71] [6.22] [7.72]
R2 0.12 0.04 0.03
Adj. R2 0.10 0.02 0.01
Sum sq. resids 27.52 1.57 1.56
SE equation 0.34 0.08 0.08
F-statistic 8.00 2.57 1.87
Log likelihood −78.92 279.44 280.00
IC 0.67 −2.20 −2.20
Schwarz SC 0.74 −2.13 −2.13
Mean dependent 0.07 0.05 0.07
SD dependent 0.35 0.08 0.08
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 4.48 × 10–06
Determinant resid covariance 4.22 × 10–06
Log likelihood 482.77
Akaike information criterion −3.72
Schwarz criterion −3.46
Standard errors in () & t-statistics in []
Sample adjusted for a period between 1984 and 2008
There are 250 observations included after adjustments
D(lnprivate): first difference of log private sector expenditure; D(lnpublic): first difference of log public sector expenditure; D(lnsale): first difference of log sales;
Lnprivate (−1): log private sector expenditure with one year lag; Lnpublic (−1): log public sector expenditure with one year lag; Lnsale (−1): log sales with one year
lag; D(lnprivate(−1)): first difference of log private expenditure with one year lag; D(lnpublic(−1)): first difference of log public expenditure with one year lag;
D(lnsale(−1)): first difference of sales with one year lag
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Table 4 Modelling government expenditure and charity expenditure as two separate variables
Cointegration equation Cointegration equation 1
Lnprivate (−1) 1
Lngoverment (−1) −0.66
(0.18)
[−3.57]
Lncharity (−1) −0.21
(0.09)
[−2.36]
Lnsale (−1) 0.16
(0.21)
[0.75]
Intercept −3.34
Error Correction D(Lnprivate) D(Lngoverment) D(Lncharity) D(Lnsale)
Cointegration equation 1 −0.08 0.01 0.14 −0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)
[−2.99] [1.63] [3.08] [−0.47]
D(lnprivate(−1)) −0.20 −0.01 −0.21 0.01
(0.06) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01)
[−3.38] [−0.74] [−2.00] [1.05]
D(lngoverment(−1)) 0.10 −0.16 −0.04 −0.08
(0.30) (0.07) (0.52) (0.07)
[0.34] [−2.45] [−0.07] [−1.17]
D(lncharity(−1)) −0.01 −0.00 −0.11 0.01
(0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01)
[−0.34] [−0.12] [−1.82] [1.60]
D(lnsale(−1)) 0.30 0.02 0.18 0.16
(0.26) (0.06) (0.44) (0.06)
[1.16] [0.40] [0.40] [2.55]
Intercept 0.06 0.04 0.15 0.06
(0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)
[2.10] [5.91] [3.05] [7.98]
R2 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.05
Adj. R2 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.03
Sum sq. resids 27.97 1.30 81.67 1.53
SE equation 0.34 0.07 0.58 0.08
F-statistic 5.49 1.82 2.95 2.30
Log likelihood −80.96 302.94 −214.88 281.99
Akaike information criterion 0.70 −2.38 1.77 −2.21
Schwarz SC 0.78 −2.29 1.85 −2.12
Mean dependent 0.07 0.03 0.14 0.07
SD dependent 0.35 0.07 0.59 0.08
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 1.23 × 10–06
Determinant resid covariance 1.12 × 10–06
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Table 4 Modelling government expenditure and charity expenditure as two separate variables (Continued)
Log likelihood 294.17
Akaike information criterion −2.13
Schwarz criterion −1.73
Standard errors in () & t-statistics in []
Sample adjusted for a period between 1984 and 2008
There are 250 observations included after adjustments
D(lngoverment): first difference of log government expenditure; D(lncharity): first difference of log charity expenditure; D(lnprivate): first difference of log private
sector expenditure; D(lnsale): first difference of log sales; Lngoverment (-1): log government expenditure with one year lag; Lncharity (-1): log charity expenditure
with one year lag; Lnprivate (−1): log private sector expenditure with one year lag Lnsale (−1): log sales with one year lag; D(lngoverment(−1)): first difference of
log government expenditure with one year lag; D(lncharity(−1)): first difference of log charity expenditure with one year lag; D(lnprivate(−1)): first difference of log
private sector expenditure with one year lag; D(lnsale(−1)): first difference of sales with one year lag
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global pharmaceutical sales nor private sector expend-
iture. The results suggest that the policy dummy in 1993
raises the change in log public expenditure by 0.04. The
policy dummy that controls for the 1 year effect in 1993
is not statistically significant in the short-run equation
for public sector expenditure.Impulse response function
Figure 6 shows that more than half of the response from
private sector expenditure as the result of a long-run
shock to public sector expenditure will happen within
the first 5 years (see Table F in Additional file 7 for the
underlying data). It would take decades for private sector
expenditure to move back to the equilibrium if there
were no further shocks. One unit increase in the log
public sector expenditure leads to 0.42 unit increase in
the log private sector expenditure within the first 5 years.
It will eventually lead to a 0.74-unit increase in the log pri-
vate sector expenditure. This figure of 0.74 is lower than
the long-run elasticity estimated to be 0.81, because the
endogeneity of public expenditure in the model causes the
1 % shock to relax back to 0.91 % over time. We do not
think this feature of the recent historical behaviour of.0
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.8
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One Unit LNPUBLIC Innovation
Fig. 6 Impulse response of an increase in public research
expenditure on private research and development expenditurethese variables is relevant for policy, so the long-run elasti-
city of 0.81 (=0.74/0.91) is our best estimate.
Discussion
In this section of the paper we discuss the limitations of
the study, present possible policy interpretations of our
empirical findings, and set out some topics for future re-
search that we have identified as a result of the present
study.
Limitations of the study
Our study is inevitably limited by the extent and quality
of the data that can be pulled together. Compilation of
series of annual data since 1982 for government and
charity expenditure, respectively, on biomedical and
health research in the UK, by disease area, was a major
task drawing on numerous sources. Inevitably, there is a
risk that disease categorisations vary over time and be-
tween organisations. We aimed to mitigate this potential
issue by relying wherever possible on the HRCS classifi-
cation. Furthermore, some data points had to be extrap-
olated in order to have complete funding streams
available over time. Nevertheless, the scope of data we
gathered over the course of this project is unique and
will be useful for further research.
Data for the disease area split of total pharmaceutical
industry R&D expenditure in the UK do not exist. A
major element of the study was to test whether it was
possible to proxy the disease area split by observing the
disease area split of later publications with pharmaceut-
ical industry authors giving UK addresses. This proxy
approach appears to have been successful. It allows for
the trend increase over time in research publications by
all types of authors, by focusing on the share of publica-
tions in each disease area each year rather than the abso-
lute number.
We considered the possibility that different pharma-
ceutical companies, which concentrate their respective
R&D programmes on different mixes of disease areas,
may differ in their propensity to encourage their re-
search staff to publish. If that were the case, the disease
split of company-authored papers would over-represent
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companies and under-represent the disease areas
favoured by low-propensity-to-publish companies. In the
period 1982–2012, there were of the order of 10 billion
biomedical research papers in Web of Science, of which
several hundred thousand can be expected to have one
or more company authors – based on a preliminary as-
sessment undertaken for us by CWTS at the University
of Leiden. The cost and time involved in extracting and
cleaning company names from these and linking those
company names to company names in earlier years
(allowing for mergers and name changes) would have
been exorbitant, so we were unable to pursue this av-
enue. However, we have no reason to expect company
propensity to publish to be correlated with company dis-
ease area preference for R&D, and hence no reason to
expect bias in our results.
An alternative proxy for the disease split of private
pharmaceutical industry R&D in the UK might be the
disease split of patents citing authors with UK
company addresses. We investigated this option but
found that the proportion of patents identified to the
nine named disease areas (Cardiology, Dermatology,
Gastroenterology, Haematology, Infectious, Neurosci-
ences, Oncology, Ophthalmology, Respiratory) was
worryingly low in some years – below 10 % – and
furthermore that there were implausibly large changes
in this proportion from year to year. We therefore
judged that the patent data would not be suitable as
a way to proxy the disease area split of pharmaceut-
ical industry R&D expenditure in the UK.
Our data set includes 10 disease areas. An obvious
question concerns the heterogeneity of the data. We
have experimented with various econometric ap-
proaches to account for this issue in our estimates.
However, all approaches were undermined by the
small number of observations at each disease level
(n = 27 in the best-fit model). We therefore decided
to estimate a model by pooling all data from the 10
diseases rather than adopting a model that addressed
the heterogeneity of the data. This limitation of the
model should be noted.
Furthermore, we pooled data from different disease
areas and built a model that assumes that expenditures
across the areas are determined independently but in a
similar fashion. A pharmaceutical company’s revenues
from sales in all of the disease areas where it currently
has products are in principle available to fund any of its
current R&D expenditure regardless of disease area.
However, global sales in a particular disease area are an
indication of the importance of that market at that time
as a target for the pharmaceutical industry. Further,
there are no better data available to proxy the supply of
funding for disease-specific private R&D investmentthan disease-specific sales, and only a short historical
record was available to construct a dynamic model, for-
cing us to tightly control the number of parameters to
be estimated.
Finally, it should be noted that coefficients of the error
correction terms, in Table 3, that embody the short-run
adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium described
by the cointegration equation suggest that both private
sector and public sector R&D expenditures respond to
any departure from the long-term equilibrium, but that
sales do not. When there is a negative departure from
the long-term equilibrium (that is, private sector R&D
lies below its equilibrium level), private sector R&D ex-
penditure responds strongly by increasing. In contrast,
public sector R&D expenditure responds to such a de-
parture by decreasing slightly. Notice that the response
is five times stronger for the private sector than for pub-
lic sector R&D expenditure.
Comparison with previous work
Compared to the previous literature, i.e. Toole [5] and
Ward and Dranove [6], the VECM has some advantages.
First, the VECM provides estimates for both the long-
and short-run relationships between variables. Ignoring
cointegration relationship(s) in modelling time series
data will, in general, lead to biased estimates. It is un-
clear from Toole’s analysis whether there is a long-run
equilibrium relationship between variables [5]. Second,
the econometric approaches adopted by Toole and by
Ward and Dranove both assume that public research in-
vestment is exogenous to private sector investment; this
strong assumption was self-criticised by Toole in the
limitation section of his paper. An advantage of using
the VECM is that it allows us to assume that private and
public sector expenditure are both endogenous.
Toole adopted a polynomial lag structure in the model
specification. The maximum number of lags chosen by
Toole to be included, i.e. 8 years, is not fully explained
by the author. The impact of this decision (the selection
of the number of lags) on the predictions of Toole’s
model is unclear but could be substantial given the
quadratic lag function. In contrast, the VECM allowed
the data to decide the number of lags to be included in a
transparent way.
Ward and Dranove used a generalised least squares
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to model govern-
ment R&D expenditure, number of medical journal arti-
cles in MEDLINE and industry R&D expenditure. A
clear advantage of this approach is that it allows for
autocorrelation across equations and more importantly
possible heteroskedasticity across disease categories.
However, relative to the VECM approach we have
adopted, there are three disadvantages of applying this
approach in modelling the R&D expenditure time series
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are assumed to be exogenous, which implicitly suggests
that direct government R&D expenditure is an exogen-
ous variable in modelling industry R&D expenditure.
Our approach avoids the need to make that strong as-
sumption. Second, in modelling the time series data, the
generalised least squares SUR approach did not address
the possible long-term relationship between variables,
but short-term effects only. Third, the equation for in-
dustry R&D expenditure includes 7 years’ lags of US Na-
tional Institutes of Health (NIH) research expenditures
as independent variables. The authors self-criticised this
specification that the “lagged value of NIH’s expenditure
exhibit a high degree of collinearity which yields large
sampling variances and greater sensitivity of the individ-
ual coefficient estimates to model specification changes”
[6].
Geographical scope
Our focus has been explicitly limited to the link between
public and private research within the UK. We have not
attempted to quantify the impact that UK public bio-
medical and health research expenditure might have on
industry R&D in the rest of the world, nor the impact of
public research spending in other countries on industry
R&D within the UK. To what extent those international
linkages exist, in either direction, represents a set of in-
teresting further research questions, but they are beyond
the scope of the present study. Moreover, data unavail-
ability seems likely to render quantification of such
international linkages impractical at present.
Interpreting our findings
Subject to these limitations and caveats, we have found a
long-term equilibrium relationship between public bio-
medical and health research spending in the UK and pri-
vate sector pharmaceutical industry R&D expenditure in
the UK. The Granger causality test was applied to the
private R&D and public research expenditure series. The
null hypothesis of the test is that one variable does not
‘Granger cause’ the other variable, i.e. adds no predictive
information not already present in the series’ own his-
tory. Our results rejected the null hypothesis at the 5 %
level in both directions, which indicates that there might
be a dual causal relationship between private R&D and
public research expenditure. Given this, a cautious inter-
pretation of our subsequent model-based findings would
be to say that we find a positive association between
additional public research spend and additional private
R&D.
We find that public research ‘crowds in’ private R&D
rather than crowding it out. A 1 % increase/fall in public
(meaning government plus charity) biomedical and
health research spend in the UK eventually is associated,in our most robust model, with a 0.81 % increase/fall in
pharmaceutical industry R&D in the UK. A sensitivity
test using dummy variables for 1993 and from that year
onwards produced a similar result with an elasticity of
0.68. We found a larger elasticity for pharmaceutical in-
dustry R&D with respect to additional government re-
search expenditure than with respect to additional
charity funded research, partly explained by the greater
scale of government than charity research.
In 2012, the most recent year for our data, UK govern-
ment plus charity research spend in the relevant fields
was £3.43bn, with £1.22bn from charity sector and
£2.21bn from government.5 In the same year, pharma-
ceutical industry R&D in the UK was £4.21bn. Given the
relative magnitude of public and private research spend-
ing in the UK in our latest year of data (2012), the elasti-
city of 0.81 implies that a £1.00 increase in public
biomedical and health research spend would result ul-
timately in a £0.99 increase in private pharmaceutical
R&D in the UK (0.81 × 4.21/3.43 = 0.99). The 0.68 elasti-
city from the sensitivity analysis with dummy variables
would correspondingly imply that on the same basis a
£1.00 increase in public research spend would lead to a
£0.83 increase in private R&D.
However, the elasticity of 0.81 has been calculated
from expenditure data over the whole of the period
1982–2008, during which time the balance between pub-
lic and private research spending has changed. Over the
27 years 1982–2008 as a whole, the ratio of aggregate
private R&D to aggregate public research spend was a
little lower than the ratio in 2012. A total of £73.2bn (in
2012 price terms) of private R&D over the period 1982–
2008 and a total of £55.3bn of public research spend
(government plus) charity, gives private R&D as 32 %
higher over that whole period than public research
spend. By comparison, in 2012, private R&D was 23 %
higher than public research spend. Applying the private:-
public ratio from the whole period 1982–2008 (rather
than the ratio in the most recent year of data, 2012)
would imply that an extra £1 of public research would
have stimulated an extra £1.07 (=0.81 × 73.2/55.3) of
private R&D. If the lower 0.68 elasticity from the sensi-
tivity test with dummy variables were used, the corre-
sponding implication would on this basis be that a £1.00
increase in public research spend would lead to a £0.90
increase in private R&D.
Based on the most recent year’s data (2012), the elasti-
city of 0.66 from government research spending alone
would imply that a £1.00 increase in government spend-
ing in biomedical and health research would result in a
£1.26 increase in private pharmaceutical R&D in the UK
(0.66 × 4.21/2.21 = 1.26). The elasticity of 0.21 from the
charity sector would imply on the same basis of 2012 ex-
penditure relativities that a £1.00 increase in charity
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in a £0.72 increase in private pharmaceutical R&D in the
UK (0.21 × 4.21/1.22 = 0.72).
However, the relativities between charity, government
and private research spend have changed over time. Ap-
plying the same elasticities to the aggregates of charity,
government and private research spend, respectively,
across the 1982–2008 period for which those elasticities
have been estimated (rather than to the 2012 expendi-
tures alone), would imply that an extra £1 of govern-
ment research spend would stimulate £1.24 (=0.66 ×
73.2/38.9) of extra private R&D, and that an extra £1 of
charity research would stimulate £0.94 (=0.21 × 73.2/
16.3) of extra private R&D.
The reasons for this modest difference in the scale of
extra private R&D that is implied would be generated by
an extra £1 of government research or charity research,
respectively, would be an interesting focus for future re-
search. Possible reasons may lie in different mixes or
types of research being funded by government as com-
pared with charity, e.g. a different basic/clinical mix –
Toole [5] found that public basic research stimulated
considerably more dollars of private R&D than did an
equal amount of clinical research. It may also be that the
government and charity sectors have, to differing
degrees, explicit matched funding arrangements with the
private sector. We hope to be able to investigate these
issues further in future research.
The impulse response function from our most robust
model implies that 44 % of the impact on private R&D
would be seen in the first year following a change in
public research spending. The remainder of the effect
would take many years, even decades to fully work
through.
Our UK-specific and up-to-date estimate of the elasti-
city of pharmaceutical industry R&D to a change in pub-
lic research spending is different from the corresponding
US elasticities found by Toole [5] and Ward and Dra-
nove [6]. Ward and Dranove estimated that a 1 %
change in government-funded medical research in the
US would stimulate a 2.5 % change in US pharmaceut-
ical industry R&D. Toole found an elasticity of 1.69 for
the impact of US public basic research on pharmaceut-
ical industry R&D in the US and 0.40 for clinical re-
search. Assuming that at least half of public research is
basic, Toole’s results imply an overall elasticity of 1.05 or
more; this compares with our main finding of an elasti-
city of 0.81. A more modest elasticity in the UK than the
US is consistent with the UK being a smaller and more
open economy than the US, meaning that a smaller per-
centage of spillovers from public research would be ex-
pected to be captured within the UK and a higher
percentage would leak out to industry in other
countries.The lower UK magnitude of elasticity has implications
for the findings of the HERG et al. [4] estimate of the
RoR to public biomedical and health research. That
study estimated an economic RoR to UK public medical
research, excluding the health gains to patients, of ap-
proximately 30 %, and cited a range from 26 % to 34 %
depending on whether the elasticity assumed is, respect-
ively, that found (for the US) by Toole [5] or that found
by Ward and Dranove [6]. That calculation assumed a
50 % social RoR to private R&D spending, based on tak-
ing an average of the findings of a review of the empir-
ical literature [4]. We have not revisited that social RoR
figure, but for illustrative purposes if it were combined
with the elasticity of 0.81 that we find, and with the rela-
tive scales of private and public research spending that
existed in the UK in 2012, then the result would imply
that the economic RoR (excluding health gains to pa-
tients) to public biomedical and health research in the
UK would be 17 % (real, per annum). In other words a
£1 investment in UK public biomedical and health re-
search would be expected to benefit the UK economy as
a whole to an extent equivalent to receiving 17 pence
per year interest for ever in return for that £1 invest-
ment. Using the relative aggregate spends of the public
and private sectors over the whole 1982–2008 period
would result in a slightly higher RoR of 18 %.
The sensitivity analysis including dummies for 1993
and thereafter yielded a slightly lower elasticity of private
R&D with respect to public research spending and
would imply, on the same calculation basis, an economic
RoR to public medical research equal to 15–16 % real
per annum (where the lower number assumes 2012 rela-
tive public:private expenditure, and the higher number
assumes 1982–2008 aggregate relativities between public
and private expenditure).
Thus, a revised estimate of the real RoR to UK public
medical research spending would appear from our re-
sults to lie in the range 15–18 %. Combined with our
earlier estimates of the net monetary benefit of health
gains arising cardiovascular research [4] and cancer [8],
this would suggest a total RoR of between 24 % and
28 % arising from government and charitable invest-
ments in research.
Future research
Using the dataset created for this study there is an
additional key research question that we will be able
to investigate in subsequent research. That is, what is
the magnitude of the effect of charity biomedical and
health research expenditure in the UK on government
biomedical and health research expenditure and vice
versa?
Additionally, further thought and investigation needs
to be focused on how ‘spillover’ effects manifest
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how the additional private sector R&D in the UK comes
about when UK public research spending increases. This
is an idea that was previously raised in a workshop on
spillovers (along with undertaking a UK biomedical and
health specific study as reported here) [43]. This is likely
to involve qualitative research into mechanisms that
generate spillover effects and the barriers that hinder
them. In particular, research is needed into how these ef-
fects are channelled through individuals and their formal
and informal interactions, including, but not limited to,
research collaborations and the labour market.
Conclusion
The objective of this study was to estimate the magni-
tude of the effect of government and charity biomedical
and health research expenditure in the UK, separately
and in total, on subsequent private pharmaceutical sec-
tor R&D expenditure in the UK. By developing an
econometric model to examine the statistical relation-
ship between time series of biomedical and health re-
search expenditures in the UK since 1982, and for
different disease areas and sectors, we are able to infer a
number of key findings relevant to UK biomedical and
health research:
1. Public research investments ‘crowd in’ additional
private sector R&D investments: every additional £1
of public research expenditure is associated with an
additional £0.83–£1.07 of private sector R&D spend;
2. 44 % of that additional private sector expenditure
occurs within 1 year, with the remainder
accumulating over decades;
3. This spillover effect implies a real annual RoR (in
terms of economic impact) to public biomedical and
health research in the UK of 15–18 %.
4. When combined with previous estimates of the
health gain that results from public medical research
in cancer and CVD, the total RoR would be around
24–28 %.
Overall, this would suggest that historical returns from
UK government and charity funded research in the UK
compare favourably with the rates of return achieved on
investments in the rest of the UK economy and are
greatly in excess of the 3.5 % real annual RoR required
by the UK government to public investments generally
[44].
Endnotes
1The return for mental health was estimated to be ap-
proximately 7 %. However, this was based on a more
limited analysis due to data limitation and uncertainties
around the effects of interventions in mental health andwas presented with less confidence than the estimates
for CVD.
2For the finalised time series we used and presented
calendar years. The first calendar year of a financial year
was used. That is, financial year 1991/1992 is presented
as calendar year 1991.
3It should be noted that in the studies on cardiovascu-
lar research [4] and cancer [8] we used the inclusive
measure as we wanted to err on the side of caution in
calculating a rate of return, potentially overestimating
investments.
4CWTS is an interdisciplinary institute at Leiden Uni-
versity providing data products and services to a variety
of research institutes. The institute utilises a bibliometric
data system (based on an enhanced version of Thomson
Reuters’ Web of Science database) enabling high-value
bibliometric analyses. See http://www.cwts.nl/Home for
more detail.
5Note that there is no general consensus on the total
UK government biomedical research spend. However,
our bottom-up estimate for government expenditure is
in the same ballpark with an estimate by the UK Clinical
Research Collaboration (2012). Using 2009/2010 data,
the UK Health Research Analysis 2009/2010 report esti-
mates governmental spend (without charity) to be
£1.304bn. Including spend on biomedical research by
the Funding Councils in that year (£590m in 2009/2010)
and, translating into 2012 constant prices, that figure be-
comes £2.032bn.
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